This article is a modified version of a commentary originally published by Éditions Yvon Blais in July 2026 (EYB2026REP3955).
The enactment of article 2858.1 of the Civil Code of Québec marked a significant development in the law of evidence relating to sexual and spousal violence. By establishing a presumption of irrelevance with respect to certain facts associated with myths and stereotypes, and by requiring an in camera hearing before such facts may be admitted into evidence, the Québec legislature sought to promote access to justice while protecting the dignity and privacy of alleged victims.
In Tulasne v. Rozon, the Superior Court ruled for the first time on the compliance of such an evidentiary framework with constitutional guarantees, and upheld the validity of article 2858.1 C.C.Q.
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The constitutional ruling arose in the context of nine civil actions brought against the defendant by various plaintiffs alleging that they were victims of sexual violence.
The defendant argued that the presumption of irrelevance and the requirement to hold an in camera hearing established by article 2858.1 C.C.Q. limited his ability to present relevant evidence and imposed an additional procedural burden on him in proceedings of a stigmatizing or defamatory nature. He invoked, in particular, an infringement of his rights to the safeguard of his reputation, to make full answer and defence, to procedural fairness, and to equality of arms. He further submitted that the in camera mechanism would infringe his right to a public hearing.
The decision
The Superior Court began by noting that article 2858.1 C.C.Q. reflects a clear intention on the part of the Québec legislature to offer, in civil matters, protections analogous to those recognized in criminal law with respect to sexual and spousal violence, as well as to encourage reporting and access to justice.
On the constitutional issue, the Court rejected the defendant’s contention that article 2858.1 C.C.Q. infringed his reputation by preventing him from presenting evidence relating to the reputation of the alleged victims, while they had been able to adduce evidence regarding his own reputation. The Court noted that the evidence relating to the defendant’s reputation stemmed from the counterclaims for defamation that he himself had brought, and added that the defendant’s reputation is established or safeguarded independently of that of the alleged victims.
As for the right to make full answer and defence, the Court noted that the provision at issue does not deprive a party of the ability to present relevant evidence, but merely makes its admission conditional upon a preliminary hearing on relevance. The Court further emphasized that there is no fundamental right to present irrelevant evidence or to base one’s defence on reasoning grounded in myths and stereotypes, which distort thetruth-seeking function of the judicial process.
The Court also rejected the defendant’s contentions regarding an infringement of the principle of equality of arms, insofar as the presumptions and the in camera mechanism apply equally to all parties to the proceeding. Moreover, the procedural inconveniences arising from the application of article 2858.1 C.C.Q. are not sufficient to compromise the fairness of the trial. Indeed, both the party seeking to introduce evidence covered by the presumptions and the party wishing to contest its relevance at an in camera hearing will have to expend time, effort, and legal fees to do so.
With respect to the right to a public hearing, the Court noted that the legislature was entitled to expressly derogate from section 23 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, in accordance with section 52 of the Charter. It further noted that the open court principle is not absolute and may be limited by law or by court order.
Finally, although it concluded that there was no infringement of the rights invoked, the Court added that any such infringement would, in any event, be justified in light of the objectives pursued by the legislature, namely the protection of victims’ dignity, privacy, equality, and access to justice.
Comment
By confirming the constitutionality of article 2858.1 C.C.Q, the Superior Court validated the Québec legislature’s approach aimed at preventing the influence of reasoning based on myths and stereotypes. It noted that the mechanism established does not impose an absolute prohibition on certain facts, but rather makes their admissibility conditional upona preliminary demonstration of their relevance.
In this sense, the provision at issue is aimed less at modifying the fundamental rules of civil procedure than at regulating the use of certain facts likely to compromise the search for the truth. Article 2858.1 C.C.Q thus appears more as a codification of limits that already flow, to a large extent, from the general rules of relevance than as a departure from the traditional principles of the law of evidence.
With this decision, the Superior Court thus solidifies the place of article 2858.1 C.C.Q. within Québec’s law of evidence and provides an analytical framework that will guide future debates on the admissibility of facts covered by this presumption of irrelevance.